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1. Introduction 
On the morning of the eighth of May 1945, as the Nazis surren-
dered to the Allies toward the end of World War II, a day now 
celebrated as Victory in Europe Day, 5,000 Algerians paraded 
through the French Algerian city of Sétif. While celebrating the 
end of the war and paying tribute to their fallen, some of those 
marching also carried banners on which messages decrying the 
colonial rule of the French were written. &ese marchers clashed 
with the local gendarmerie — literally, “armed people,” a facet of 
the French military tasked with local law enforcement — when 
the gendarmerie attempted to seize their anti-colonial placards. 
&ere is some debate about who 'red the 'rst shot, but what 
happened next is uncontroversial in its essentials. Both the po-
lice and the protesters, including those carrying banners and 
others, su(ered numerous casualties. Armed protesters cap-
tured and slaughtered Europeans in the streets. And on that 
same evening, a peaceful protest orchestrated by the Algerian 
People’s Party in the nearby city of Guelma was suppressed with 
shocking violence. 
In the rural areas surrounding Sétif, news of police brutality 
led angry locals to attack pieds-noirs, a segment of the popula-
tion comprised largely of ethnically French people born in Alge-
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ria and people whose ancestors had migrated to French Algeria 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. &e pieds-noirs 
overwhelmingly supported the colonial rule of the French, and 
this fact played a justi'catory role in the attacks against them 
which directly followed the violence in Sétif. &ese attacks led 
to the deaths of 102 Europeans, almost all of whom were civil-
ians. &ere were, in addition, hundreds of non-fatal injuries, in-
cluding systematic rape and corollary trauma. &e mutilation 
and desecration of corpses was widespread. &e French mili-
tary quelled the rebellion a*er several days, with a great deal of 
damage already having been done. But the military didn’t rest 
contented with having put down this resistance. &ey enacted 
a number of brutal reprisals on settlers and Algerian Muslims 
alike. In a ratissage or “raking-over” of the countryside near Sé-
tif and Guelma, the military carried out summary executions, 
bombed villages entire, and shelled the town of Kherrata from 
a cruiser in the Gulf of Béjaïa. Pieds-noirs, reacting to assaults 
and seeking vengeance, lynched randomly selected Algerian 
Muslims who had been incarcerated in local prisons. Staking 
a bloody claim to vigilante justice, they shot whoever was seen 
wearing a white arm band — a symbol of the resistance — with 
no questions asked.1 Perhaps it is unsurprising that most of the 
victims of this violence weren’t involved in the original protests 
on the eighth of May. 
Altogether, the violence that followed the events in Sétif and 
Guelma is estimated to have led to between 1,020 and 45,000 
fatalities. &ere is of course a stark di(erence between the lower 
and upper limits of this estimate. &ere is not much reason to 
doubt that the violence which took place on the eighth of May 
and shortly therea*er brought about a great many avoidable 
deaths. Many of those who died in this unrest were horri'cally 
1 Like the violence perpetrated by the recently defeated Nazi regime, this 
violence was committed mit keine Fragen, extra-judicially and with no 
questions asked. For further information, the reader may "nd it helpful 
to refer to Mehana Amrani, Le 8 mai 1945 en Algérie: Les discours français 
sur les massacres de Sétif, Kherrata et Guelma (Paris: Editions L’Harmattan, 
2010).
115
THOSE WHO AREN’T COUNTED
slaughtered, and many of those who survived were nevertheless 
condemned to lead lives warped from their having taken part in 
the violence or misshapen by the tremendous burden of mourn-
ing in the wake of this inhumanity. &ere’s plenty of reason to 
'nd these events tragic. But many of us, looking back at these 
events, will be more inclined to consider the violence a severer 
tragedy if it led to 45,000 deaths rather than 1,020, just as we 
would be inclined to 'nd an event that caused 100 deaths, while 
still tragic, even less severe. 
&e 'gure of 1,020 deaths was reported by the French gov-
ernment in the Tubert Report, shortly a*er the events that took 
place in Sétif and Guelma. &e 'gure of 45,000 deaths was re-
ported by Radio Cairo, also very soon a*er the violence sub-
sided. Now, if we set aside the horri'c but non-fatal barbarity of 
the injuries that resulted from this con+ict — wounds no doubt 
physical, psychological, and social — and focus simply on the 
reported number of fatalities, which is o*en used to mark a con-
+ict’s severity, we’ll notice a signi'cant narrative di(erence be-
tween the two reported 'gures: 1,020 deaths and 45,000 deaths. 
Each 'gure tells, and 'ts into, a di(erent story about what went 
on in Sétif and Guelma on the eighth of May and soon a*er, and 
about what it means. Each 'gure conveys a di(erent sense of 
the magnitude of the tragedy. And each makes various attitudes 
in response to that tragedy seem more or less apt. If the num-
ber of fatalities was 1,020, as the o,cial French report claims, 
then a certain attitude toward the violence might seem more 
appropriate: though we regret that anyone had to die in such a 
way, we might be willing to say that the death toll was the price 
that had to be paid for civil peace. Although it sounds crass, and 
maybe for good reason, we might be thankful that more people 
who might have perished were saved from this fate. &e con+ict 
might in this sense look less bad than it could have been, in vir-
tue of a comparison between the number of fatalities that were 
its consequence and the number that might conceivably have 
resulted had things been only slightly di(erent. If the number of 
fatalities was 45,000, however, then we might take the violence 
to have been worse in degree than had it been 1,020. We might 
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'nd the tragedy severer, the burden of mourning weightier, the 
horror of what went on in Sétif and Guelma more intense and 
less comprehensible. For even if all these deaths were the cost of 
the mitigation of unrest, even if there had been no imaginable 
alternative, it may yet seem to us that 45,000 deaths are consid-
erably costlier than 1,020 deaths, or any lesser number for that 
matter. 
We may feel that our reason to be saddened by this trage-
dy — to mourn, to seek in its light to prevent similar con+icts 
from escalating in this way in the future, to take the violence 
of Sétif and Guelma as a historical example of atrocity — is 
proportional to the number of the dead. &is is a common at-
titude when it comes to atrocities: the greater the number of 
the dead, the more tragic we say it was. &is attitude seems to 
me to be mistaken, since it rests on what I take to be a distorted 
picture of the real a-iction that those who perished in Sétif and 
Guelma underwent. A sense of atrocity, based in part on the 
fatality count that conveys an impression of its severity, stands 
in for the a!iction of those who, whatever the fatality count, 
were indeed downtrodden. We should, 'rst and foremost, at-
tend to and mourn this a-iction when we are trying to under-
stand historical tragedies and con+icts, wars and injustices. &e 
atrocity signi'ed by the number of a body count o*en obscures 
the genuine a-iction that real people experienced. It covers 
over the su(ering that in some cases characterized their lives 
and the lives of those who knew them. I believe that this has an 
enormously deleterious e(ect on our capacity to make sense of, 
mourn, and live in light of the horrors of our past. An ethical 
attitude toward these horrors, I will argue, demands attention to 
the a-iction su(ered by the injured and the dead, no matter the 
putative severity of the atrocity given meaning by the number 
of fatalities. 
In coming to terms with one’s history — insofar as this is pos-
sible (I don’t claim that the relevant mourning is ever necessarily 
completable, though I don’t think this prevents it from being 
practicable) — the moral person keeps her eyes 'xed on a-ic-
tion rather than atrocity, on the su(ering of each person who 
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endured tragic circumstances or died under them, rather than 
on the count of bodies or list of injuries. In the face of atrocity, 
the moral person turns her attention to a-iction. In the face of 
the impression of tragedy given by a body count, she turns her 
attention instead to those who aren’t counted, to the su(ering 
that can never be counted. &is, I will contend, is the shape the 
moral person’s attitude takes with regard to events such as those 
that went on in Sétif and Guelma. 
2. Analogy and Atrocity 
As is shown by the dissensus with respect to the number of 
fatalities that resulted from the violence of Sétif and Guelma, 
the number of a body count is implicated in a wider political 
narrative, within which this violence and its a*ermath are to 
be made sense of.2 In the case I’ve been discussing, this is either 
the narrative of the French colonial government (1,020 deaths) 
or that of the Algerian resistance (45,000 deaths). &e wide gap 
between the two estimates isn’t merely the consequence of, say, 
hasty miscounting, misreporting, or confusion due to the ongo-
ing con+ict and an attendant lack of cooperation and commu-
nication, though these are surely relevant. Rather, the divergent 
numbers 'nd their place, and are as such intelligible, in diver-
gent worldviews. &ese numbers are, in this sense, given from 
2 To put it another way, the number of a fatality count is, in a certain sense 
about which I’ll try to get clear, politically theory-laden. As Paul Feyera-
bend writes, “Not only are facts and theories in constant disharmony, 
they are never as neatly separated as everyone makes them out to be.” 
%e fact of the number of the body count and its weight or signi"cance 
can’t be neatly separated from the theoretical apparatus of what I’ll call an 
“analogy.” %is is the set of relations in and through which sense is made 
of a&iction as atrocity. %e fact of a body count of 1,020 is intelligible as 
such to those who see a certain atrocity, who have a certain going theory 
or narrative about what went on in Sétif and Guelma. %e fact of a count 
of 45,000 is intelligible to those who see another atrocity, who have a dif-
ferent theory or narrative about what went on in Sétif and Guelma; they 
make di)erent sense of it. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method (London: 
Verso, 2010), 51.
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political stances, which lend them the credence of context. From 
the point of view of the French government, or for those who 
share a similar sense of things, the body count of 1,020 makes 
sense. It 'ts into a wider frame, without thereby calling that 
frame too much into question, and it then comes to have fur-
ther application (justi'catory and otherwise) within that frame. 
Likewise, from the point of view of the Algerian resistance or its 
allies, the body count of 45,000 is intelligible, and this 'ts into 
an operative frame, while the suggestion that the proper count 
is actually 1,020 looks — from this vantage point — jarring, de-
ceitful, or senseless. If this suggestion is plausible, the pressure 
may lead one to adjust one’s view of things accordingly (perhaps 
beyond the scope of this speci'c incident). If it isn’t received as 
plausible, it may be dismissed on that account, and the pressure 
that would cause one to change one’s view, or to have to invent 
a way to deny the plausibility of the suggestion, won’t be felt.3 
It seems plausible that at least very many of those who inhab-
ited each point of view took the number of fatalities asserted by 
the representative of that view — either the French government 
or Radio Cairo — to be accurate. &ey were sincere in assert-
ing that either 1,020 or 45,000 is the proper count, though both 
evidently couldn’t have been right about this. But all the same, 
the numeric product that results from the count of bodies, the 
quanti'cation of the fallen, is the outcome of an operation that 
takes place within a certain sort of political or social structure. I 
will call this structure an “analogy.”
3 %is simpli"es things to a certain extent. In some cases, the suggestion will 
be received as entirely implausible because an operative view is so strongly 
held or so resistant to information that con+icts with it; in such cases, the 
pressure that would cause one to change one’s view won’t be felt much at 
all. In other cases, the suggestion will be received as pretty implausible, 
as likely to be false, or as questionable, but it won’t be dismissed outright. 
%is may lead one to change one’s view in a minor way, or to repress or 
twist the information received, since that information won’t be received 
as wholly worthy of dismissal. But the point stands: one’s view a)ects the 
information one receives. We always acquire information in the midst of 
things, with a view already in place, more or less liable to change depend-
ing on what facts are received and how they’re received. 
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An analogy works like this. From the vantage point of a par-
ticular community or social position, within a certain frame 
of understanding by means of which particular sorts of people 
(who are o*en identi'ed as such by attributes of such-and-such 
a type) make sense of the world and their place in it, it is held 
as true and importantly meaningful that there’s a speci'c cor-
relation — an analogy — between those who have perished and 
the narrative of their a-iction. &e dead are tied to a certain 
story, seen from a certain view, and this analogy or correlation 
is what I mean by an “atrocity.” An atrocity is this analogical link 
that unites the dead and a particular narrative about what they 
su(ered and how they died. It’s a link that makes sense from a 
particular view of things and can be seen — depending on the 
narrative and how tightly it 'ts with the facts of the a-iction 
(insofar as these are known and open to public view) — to be 
more or less apt in relation to the wider perspective. In other 
words, an atrocity is the partial sense made of a-iction from a 
politically or socially speci'c view. It relies on, helps to explain, 
and is commonly furthered by particular answers (which have 
to be seen as more or less intelligible) to the questions: “How 
many people died there?” and “In what way did they die?” and 
“Who (what sort of person) killed them, and for what reason?” 
An atrocity is an analogical structure with two terms: those 
who perished, on the one hand, and the narrative of their af-
+iction, on the other. It is the “third” that unites these terms 
in itself. As terms of the consequent atrocity, the dead and the 
story into which they 't can’t be understood as extricable from 
their mutual relation, so far as those who see the atrocity as an 
atrocity are concerned. &e dead can’t be stripped of their nar-
rative signi'cance, which grants their deaths sense for a speci'c 
community of the living. Likewise, the narrative can’t be un-
derstood apart from those who died, to whom it grants a par-
ticular meaning for the living. &e number of fatalities plays an 
important part in this analogy. &is number, intelligible as such 
from within a particular point of view, ties together the victims 
and the meaning given to what they su(ered. What results is an 
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atrocity. &e number then signi'es and stands in for the atroc-
ity, understood to look a certain way (to which the number of 
fatalities is to give voice) from a particular point of view.
&e atrocity — from whatever perspective, whichever atroc-
ity one sees — subsumes under it both those who have perished 
and the narrative of their a-iction. It’s an analogy in which 
these terms are comprehensible only as indistinct. We can put it 
this way: those who have perished are always already those who 
have partaken in the narrative of their a-iction, and that narra-
tive isn’t separable from those who have perished. Where there 
was a-iction, where ordinary people were forced to undergo 
real horrors, the quanti'cation of the fallen produces an atrocity 
whose number crystallizes its sense.
3. A$iction
&e a-iction that was su(ered in Sétif and Guelma is, for each 
person who underwent it, one and the same, no matter whether 
the death toll was 1,020 or 45,000. A-iction isn’t something that 
can be measured, weighed, or subject to comparison. It can’t be 
counted. But the atrocity is radically di(erent in each case. It can 
be measured, weighed, or subject to comparison — in fact, it just 
is what can be so counted. It is crystallized by means of a speci'c 
number, and this number can in certain situations belie it or the 
wider view from which it is seen.
&e a-iction of those who met their end in Sétif and Guelma 
or endured its violence precedes the analogical structure of the 
atrocity. From the view of the a-icted, their a-iction isn’t yet 
atrocious. In the 'rst place, a-iction is without atrocity. When 
the French government made sense of the a-iction su(ered in 
Sétif and Guelma by means of the count of 1,020, they dealt with 
atrocity. Radio Cairo too dealt with atrocity by way of the count 
of 45,000. In neither of these cases was the a-iction itself — pri-
or to its transformation into atrocity — dealt with. 
A-iction is di(erent from atrocity in kind, while an atrocity 
with a signifying number of 1,020 is di(erent in degree from one 
that has a number of 45,000. &e former atrocity is like the latter 
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in this way: each is a violent set of events — in many ways, the 
same set of events — that occurred in the context of the Nazi’s 
surrender and the French colonial occupation of Algeria. We 
could conceivably add further details to our characterization of 
these events, some of which would 't into the identi'able nar-
rative structures of both atrocities. (&is isn’t of course true of 
all the major details, as is shown by the question of how many 
people died in the violence.) Even so, the former atrocity is un-
like the latter atrocity in this way: we’re likely to consider the 
latter atrocity less grave, and this picture of things meshes with 
a particular frame of social and political reference and under-
standing. 
So a-iction can’t be more or less than what it is. But atrocity 
is always more or less than what it is; this intensive di(erence is 
given in large part by the atrocity’s unique number — the prod-
uct of the body count — in contrast to other plausible numbers 
in which one could put one’s faith (or in which others put their 
faith). 
&e atrocity in which 1,020 people were killed di(ers in quan-
tity from that in which 45,000 people were killed. But it would 
be a mistake to see this as merely a di(erence in quantity. Each 
number tells a distinct story about what went on in Sétif and 
Guelma. Each paints a particular picture of the events, and each 
comes to light in a distinct worldview. Each number thus lends 
the atrocity a di(erent sense or weight (we might say, a di(er-
ent atrociousness). And each comes to symbolize this sense or 
weight — in a way, to stand in for it. &e apparent di(erence in 
quantity between 1,020 and 45,000 is an intensive or qualitative 
di(erence, and really a narrative di(erence. &e fatality count 
gives voice to the qualitative fabric of a particular point of view 
with respect to what happened in Sétif and Guelma and what it 
should be taken to mean. &e resultant number expresses and 
carries a speci'c — and generally communal — opening onto 
the world. It is an aperture onto the past and a symbol which 
then 'gures in mourning, with which one then tries to live go-
ing forward.
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Now the quality to which the number of the body count 
gives voice comes to life in an analogy. In this analogy, the self 
and the other — those who see atrocity and those who were af-
+icted — are seen to be inextricable, tied together in a knot that 
is productive of sense. &e quality of the atrocity has a recog-
nizable structure. I will call this the atrocity’s “for-y” structure. 
&e self and the other are seen to be necessarily “for” each other 
(y), and each is in itself unthinkable without this “for” and the 
other term (y) to which it is tied by way of the “for.” &e “for,” 
however, isn’t transitive. &e dead “for” those who see atrocity 
aren’t those who see atrocity and have to live in the face of it. 
&at is, the analogical form of the atrocity is made up of two 
more basic analogies, of which it is the reticulation: the self “for” 
the other and the other “for” the self, the living who have to go 
forward in light of atrocity and the a-icted who are intelligible 
under a certain atrocious aspect for those who see their a-ic-
tion as atrocity. &e unique number of the atrocity, the result 
of the count of bodies, isn’t merely quantitative, since it gives 
a condensed expression to the “for,” the quality that unites the 
dead and the living in atrocity’s analogical schema. &e number 
marks this “for.” It symbolizes the analogical reticulation that 
gives the terms of the analogy their sense precisely insofar as 
they are its terms. 
&e result of the body count is the locution in number that 
stands in for the atrocity. It represents the analogical relation 
of the two more basic analogies, each of which involves a non-
transitive “for-y” quality. So the quantity of the fatality count 
names, as it were, the quality of the given violence as an atroc-
ity, helping to determine and serving to enunciate its apparent 
severity and its essence. 
4. Quantifying the Fallen
I have been arguing that the unique number of a body count 
marks the quality — the dual “for-y” structure — of an atrocity. 
It 'ts into a particular view, and it comes to give expressive and 
symbolic weight to a vision of the atrociousness of a set of events 
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(which then colors these events through and through). &e 
number of the fatality count both 'ts into and in part carries a 
wider view. But how is it given? I don’t mean to ask about how 
a count of bodies is undertaken in its logistical details. Rather, I 
mean to ask about how it is seen from, and done by those who 
inhabit, a speci'c view of a set of events, a view through which 
this set of events takes a particular shape as an atrocity with an 
identi'able sense.
&e unique number that stands in for the severity and mean-
ing of an atrocity is given by a political or communal operation, 
a shared way of making sense of what has happened by con-
densing a joint understanding (thereby solidifying it) into a sort 
of crystal: the number of the body count. I’ll call this operation 
the “count-as-x.” For the French government, the violence of 
Sétif and Guelma was counted-as-1,020. For the Algerian resist-
ance, it was counted-as-45,000. Counting-as bestows sense. It 
folds seemingly senseless and o*en traumatic events into a nar-
rative structure, and it compresses that structure into the potent 
symbol of a 'gure. As we will see, this operation’s excess is real 
a-iction. &at is what is set aside — forgotten, fundamentally 
neglected — in the production of atrocity, done by means of the 
count-as-x. 
Now the count-as-x also counts its x as one in the end. For in-
stance, the 1,020 or 45,000 counts for one as “Sétif and Guelma,” 
as “what happened there.” A certain univocity is established, 
imposed on a series of discrete events, on the a-iction su(ered 
by each victim (each person who became a victim) beyond the 
frame of the atrocity. &is counting-as-one aids in the produc-
tion of sense, and it is of especial importance if that sense is to be 
shared among the members of a polity or passed along within a 
social sphere. It’s this counting-as-one that enables the lesson of 
Sétif and Guelma to be taught to children in a digestible way; it 
is this that 'nds its way into history textbooks. What is missed, 
though, is the a-iction — passed over in the count-as-x and ne-
glected entirely in the x = one that solidi'es an atrocity made 
sensible in a-iction’s place. 
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&e singular people who su(ered in Sétif and Guelma thus 
come under a particular form of description — in e(ect, a for-
mal order — which thematizes the a-iction as atrocity by means 
of a dual counting operation: the count-as-x and the x = one. Af-
+iction is made sense of in terms of the particular analogical 
quality of the atrocity. It is only glimpsed, so to speak, through 
a decidedly atrocious lens.4 In this way, it is distorted, rendered 
intelligible for those who inhabit a particular view of things 
(which itself isn’t limited to retrospection). 
&e operation of the count-as-x produces a number, x, which 
is given analogically. &is number’s sense is that of the anal-
ogy — the atrocity — which it marks. &e communal or politi-
cal sphere, as we have seen, structures itself analogically around 
4 Reiner Schürmann writes that “[h]egemonies transform the singular into 
a particular. %ey serve to say what is, to classify and inscribe, to distribute 
proper and common nouns.” Reiner Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, 
trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 7. 
%ere are, it seems to me, important similarities between Schürmann’s 
hegemonies and the totalizing analogies I am considering here. Both 
transform the singular other person into a particular: the other “for” me, 
“for” us, “for” the living. Both classify and inscribe, rendering a&iction 
narrowly intelligible as atrocity. Now the question for us is this. Is there a 
way in which the particular, the realm of the hegemony, might no longer 
be seen as the “chief-represented” (ἡγεμών) but merely as the represented? 
Can we come to see the analogical as no longer hegemonic, as secondary 
to what’s singular and, in this secondariness, as coexistent with the primacy 
of the singular? %at is: can we inhabit analogy without letting it become 
totalizing or hegemonic? %is question takes a number of forms across 
various subject matters in philosophy. Consider these examples. Can 
preferential love coexist with love for strangers? Can community coexist 
with genuine hospitality? Can ethics coexist with politics? %is form of 
question underlies much of my thinking here and elsewhere. It would not 
be inaccurate to put it this way. How can we keep the inherent partiality 
or inadequacy of analogy forefront in our minds while still inhabiting it, 
and what follows from doing so? How can we keep, in some sense, what 
hegemonic structures are while dissolving their hegemonic quality? I think 
that is o3en possible, though it requires, sometimes, changes to the struc-
tures themselves. One case in which it’s possible is this: the sense made 
of a&iction as atrocity can be kept as non-totalizing insofar as one bears 
witness to the a&iction itself in its primacy. %is essay attempts to get clear 
about how that would work.
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calamitous events. Hence, these events are understood as atroc-
ities, made intelligible within a speci'c frame. &e atrocity is 
woven into a particular social fabric and in turn helps to sup-
port that fabric (or adds to it) by crystallizing a-iction in an 
atrocious number that makes it meaningful and thus more bear-
able. &rough the operation of the count-as-x and the analogical 
givenness of the atrocity, and especially through the counting-
as-one of x, those who inhabit the relevant social position or 
community can chart a course forward in the face of what has 
happened. &ey can make sense of the past, mourn in a way 
that seems more or less accomplishable, and 'gure out how best 
to live going forward. But in so doing, they have forgotten the 
a-iction of those whose su(ering has been rendered, always 
in hindsight, atrocious. &is a-iction comes under a qualify-
ing description that makes it intelligible to those with a certain 
view; such is the movement from a-iction to atrocity. It is this 
attitude to the horrors of the past, which considers them atroci-
ties, with which I want to take issue. 
5. 'e Topology of the 'ree-as-One
It will be useful to try to get a sense of the topological form 
of the communal or political sphere as it functions here. &is 
sphere takes a speci'able shape in the analogical fashioning of 
atrocity, in making a-iction in this way intelligible. I now want 
to get clear about this shape. 
To get going, consider the structure of an analogy that I 
identi'ed in §2. It comprises two terms — the self and the other, 
those who see an atrocity and those who were a-icted — and 
a dual set of non-transitive relations between them; these rela-
tions give rise to the analogy’s “for-y” qualities. &ere’s the self 
“for” the other (the living who must go forward in the face of 
past injustices) and the other “for” the self (the dead who are in-
telligible under an atrocious aspect for the living). Neither term 
can be understood as separable from the other. &eir relation is 
treated as primitive. &e other isn’t really other here, not abso-
lutely. &e two terms are thought under the aspect of a third: the 
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analogy itself, the atrocity that ties them together. In our analy-
sis, there appear to be three operative terms: the self, the other, 
and the atrocity. But all three have to be thought as one, within 
the bounds of the atrocity in which the 'rst two terms — self 
and other — are comprehensible as inextricable. &is topology, 
this shape of the community of the living and the dead, is what 
I will call “the three-as-one.” For there are three terms, but all 
are, in essence, as one, under the aspect of the third: the atrocity 
itself. 
In the topology of the three-as-one, the self and the other 
are tied together in the introduction of a third term (the anal-
ogy itself) such that they can’t be isolated from one another. So 
there exist three terms in the three-as-one, but they aren’t dis-
tinct terms. &ey are as one. &e self isn’t itself thinkable apart 
from the other, and the other isn’t itself thinkable apart from the 
self. Moreover, neither of these basic relations can be thought 
without the other, for as we saw the analogy is the relationship 
between two non-transitive “for-y” relations. &e self and the 
other only exist intelligibly insofar as they exist within the limits 
of the third term. &ey must be thought within its frame. &e 
a-icted are the sense made of them for the living by way of the 
count-as-x. &e living are those who have to 'gure out how to 
go forward in view of history’s atrocities. &ese terms — the self 
and the other, the living and the dead — are thinkable only in 
the relational schema, taken to be originary, of the analogy un-
der which they have always already been subsumed. 
&e a-icted exist for the living. Within the analogy, then, 
they are di(erent from the living only in degree. &ey are not 
the living, to be sure, but they crucially go on living with the 
living — they are the sense the living make of them (in part, by 
counting them as x, and then as one). In the three-as-one, the 
dead and the living are unthinkable apart from the analogy as a 
whole. Atrocity functions in precisely this way. It takes the shape 
of a three-as-one. &ose who perished and the narrative of their 
a-iction can’t be thought in separation from their conjoining in 
the third: the analogy itself qua atrocity.
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I say that an attitude toward the past’s unjust deaths accord-
ing to which they’re to be seen under the aspect of atrocity is 
not ethical. A-iction is made intelligible as atrocity through the 
operation of the count-as-x and x = one. What’s le* out is a-ic-
tion itself. &e idea that atrocity is su,cient, that we must turn 
our attention to atrocity if we wish to understand the cruelties 
of history and make a life in light of them, leads us to neglect the 
a-iction of real, ordinary people. I believe that this neglect pre-
vents us from actually coming to terms with the past. It keeps us 
from really mourning, from leading lives in which we are atten-
tive to what has happened in our history. It doesn’t allow us to 
approach events such as those that went on in Sétif and Guelma 
in an ethical manner. Living well in view of such events means 
contending with a-iction, not forgetting this in contending 
with atrocity. 
I have described the attitude according to which past a-ic-
tions are to be seen as atrocities, and so not as they really are, 
as not ethical. I don’t say it is unethical. For I want to emphasize 
that this attitude doesn’t involve a choice to conceive of a-ic-
tions as atrocities (though particular choices may indeed follow 
from this conception); as if one knew full well, in conceiving 
of a-ictions as atrocities, that a transformation had gone on. 
&e person who sees an atrocity is not cognizant of having an 
immoral attitude, nor of seeing the world wrongly. Rather, she 
has simply forgotten a-iction. Her error consists in letting it 
slip from mind, thereby allowing for atrocity’s constitution. &is 
forgetting makes room for atrocity. &e moral failure here is a 
failure to stay vigilant, to keep up a certain wakefulness regard-
ing the past’s a-ictions. 
Someone who sees an atrocity in a-iction’s place has a for-
getful attitude toward history’s injustices. In this sense, it is not 
ethical, since an ethical attitude toward these injustices would 
involve the perception of a-iction and the vigilant maintenance, 
the remembering, of this perspicuous vision. &e person who 
sees atrocity needs to be woken up, and then needs to keep her-
self awake. 
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An atrocity is a kind of totalizing construction; it tethers the 
dead to a certain narrative about their a-iction, and it forgets 
that a-iction itself. It renders the dead not really other than the 
living, for neither can be fully understood except through their 
analogical relation. In an atrocity, the dead are nothing but the 
sense the living make of them. &ey are said to be this and noth-
ing besides. So an atrocity totalizes, under its own aspect, the af-
+iction of those who perished. It takes what it speaks of to be all 
there is to speak of when it comes to history’s calamitous events. 
It presumes to have no outside — or if it has one, it isn’t think-
able; it isn’t something to which one could attend in mourn-
ing. &is atrocious construction is generally retrospective: the 
a-icted don’t themselves construct it, since it operates by means 
of a count-as-x that goes on in hindsight, and it is more or less 
completed, producing a largely closed sense of the atrocity and 
its constitutive events, in the count-as-one of x.
An atrocity gives the impression of being su,cient with re-
spect to what has happened. To those who inhabit the relevant 
point of view, it doesn’t look as if it leaves behind any excess. 
&at this isn’t the case is only shown when contrary points of 
view come on the scene. &e dissensus about the fatality count 
in Sétif and Guelma doesn’t only show that there are two di(er-
ent atrocities, one marked by the count-as-1,020 and the other 
by the count-as-45,000. It also shows that both of these atroci-
ties have an outside — and indeed, a common outside. &is is 
the a-iction of those who perished in the violence which, one 
and the same, was su(ered by each a-icted person. Both atroci-
ties endeavor to make this a-iction intelligible under an atro-
cious description or within the bounds of a formal order. But 
they do this through totalization and neglect, and it’s in this 
sense that they stand in the way of an ethical attitude to the hor-
rors of the past. For atrocity renders a genuine encounter with 
the other — the a-icted — unthinkable. &e three terms of the 
three-as-one, recall, are always as one, inextricable from one an-
other. &e a-icted are only encountered as those who can be 
counted among the victims of atrocity, seen “for” those whose 
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vision is of atrocity. Since the other would be beyond the anal-
ogy, within the analogy it is the unencounterable par excellence. 
&ere can be no other in the three-as-one; the “as-one” pre-
cludes this. &ere can’t be anything di(erent in kind from what 
is within the atrocity, held fast by it. Any other is o( the table 
from the point of atrocity’s constitution in the count-as-x. &e 
other can di(er only in degree from the self, as what’s intelligi-
ble only in the sense in which it’s “for” the self, made analogi-
cal. It may seem that I am making heavy weather over this. But 
there’s a reason for that. &is is how the forgetting of a-iction 
characteristic of the three-as-one operates, and this forgetting 
is distinctive of the attitude with which I am taking issue. &e 
production of atrocity — in the count-as-x and x = one — essen-
tially involves the neglect of a-iction. &e “for-y” quality of the 
analogy is imposed; the dead are seen to be fundamentally tied 
up with the sense made of them, and this forces them into a con-
text or position that is the same as that of the living — a context 
that is not the a-icted’s. To be sure, this doesn’t appear to be an 
imposition from within the view of things that constitutes, and 
is then in part constituted by, the production of atrocity. But that 
is precisely the three-as-one’s amnesia at work. 
&e position into which the other is put, under which they’re 
in e(ect subsumed, is thought to be knowable by means of a sort 
of empathy. Since the other is already just what it is in relation to 
the self within the analogy, it is imagined that the self can step 
into the other’s shoes, so to speak, without much of a problem. 
And having done this, the self can try them on for size. In this 
way, the living take themselves to be able to get a grip on those 
who died atrociously. Understanding seems to come easily. Yet 
the living can’t empathetically get a handle on a-iction itself, 
because this very empathetic “getting a handle on…” relies on 
the neglect of a-iction. It operates only given a kind of lethargy. 
In this lethargy or forgetfulness, a supposedly easily acquirable 
understanding of analogy rids us of humility with respect to his-
tory’s horrors. 
&e other and the self are each understood in their mutual 
indistinction. Empathy here turns on the introduction of a third 
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term, an analogical bridge, which lets the self to some extent step 
into the other’s place.5 At least, so far as the self is concerned. 
&e third term is a “like” or “unlike” relation that an other is 
seen to bear to oneself; the other is seen, in virtue of their simi-
larity to or di(erence in degree from oneself, to have a relational 
property (being like or unlike oneself in such-and-such a way or 
to such-and-such an extent) by means of which they’re intelligi-
ble to one as such. &e a-icted are perhaps like those who look 
back on them from the perspective of Radio Cairo, since both 
have dealt with the threat of European colonialism. Or maybe 
the a-icted are unlike those who look back from the perspec-
tive of the French government, since they don’t share particu-
lar political beliefs. &is “like” or “unlike” term serves to bridge 
the gap between the self and the other. &is bridge is all that is 
needed to get analogical empathy going, even across great quali-
tative divides (as the manifest bridging ability of the “unlike” 
5 In his psychoanalytic self psychology, Heinz Kohut de"nes empathy as 
“vicarious introspection.” When one empathizes, one vicariously intro-
spects into the other; one tries the other’s shoes on for size, by way of one’s 
relation to the other and the qualities one sees the other to have. I compare 
this to Husserl’s account of empathy in my “%e Givenness of Other Peo-
ple,” forthcoming. Kohut’s self psychological method of empathy is a clear 
example of the sort of analogical ethic — the conception of one’s rightful 
relationship with other people — against which I am writing. It may be 
helpful to refer, when considering my talk of analogical empathy, to Ko-
hut’s essay “Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis: An Examination 
of the Relationship between Mode of Observation and %eory,” Journal of 
the American Psychoanalytic Association 7, no. 3 (1959): 459–83, as well as 
to Heinz Kohut, Analysis of the Self (New York: International Universities 
Press, 1979), 176–77. %ere seems to me to be something similar in Graham 
Harman’s development of his object-oriented ontology in ethics. Harman 
claims that the relation between oneself (x) and the other (y) exists as a 
compound object, x–y, which is morality’s locus. Indeed, Harman tells us 
that “ethics is about the compound of subject and object.” Here, I would 
like to dissent. Ethics is about how the compound of subject and object is 
insu7cient with regard to the other; it is about how the other isn’t merely 
an object for a subject. Graham Harman, Object-Oriented Ontology: A New 
Theory of Everything (London: Pelican Books, 2018), 107.
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term brings to bear).6 With the analogy in place, the seeming 
possibility of an empathetic grasp on the atrocious position of 
the dead leads us to further abandon the idea that atrocity has 
an outside. We take ourselves, within the three-as-one, to have 
come to terms with those who have died. And empathy makes 
it look as if we aren’t missing anything in this. But of course, we 
have forgotten the actual a-iction of ordinary people. 
&e self and the other are seen to exist only within the 
bounds of their empathetic relationship, which is evidently 
geared toward the self who presumes to empathize with the af-
+icted. &e self is set as the norm, the constituting center, in 
relation to which the other di(ers only by a given degree. &e 
other orbits the self, as it were. &e three-as-one doesn’t admit 
of any genuine alterity that would precede the position of the 
analogy’s terms as terms. It takes the relation between the terms, 
centered on the self or the living, to be primitive. And so, it for-
gets a-iction. 
&e topology of the three-as-one is the shape that the com-
munity of the living and the dead takes in neglecting a-iction 
and attending instead to atrocity. But I want to suggest that re-
membering a-iction doesn’t mean merely negating the three-
as-one, +ying out and into the void. It isn’t an abdication of the 
task of coming to grips with history’s horrors. Rather, the re-
membrance of a-iction leads to a community of the living and 
the dead (that is, an encounter between them) that has a di(er-
ent, and to my mind morally preferable, shape. I will call this 
the topology of “the two.” &is topology is prior to the three-as-
one, as a-iction is to atrocity, and it is foreclosed to those who 
inhabit the totalizing analogical schema that gives rise to and is 
carried by the vision of atrocity.7 
6 %is being so, empathy may still be harder to start, and one may conse-
quently be able to hold on to more humility, in cases where the other is 
seen to be very unlike — even if still di)erent in degree from — the self. But 
this isn’t always the case; sometimes, great di)erences in degree seem to 
motivate pernicious forms of xenophobia and the like. 
7 %ere are three distinctions, similar in a number of ways to the distinc-
tion I’ve drawn between a&iction and atrocity, that may be pro"table to 
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6. 'e Topology of the Two
&e topology of the two is the space in which I encounter an 
other who isn’t me or of me. It is the space in which I come up 
against an outside I cannot hope to assimilate or incorporate. 
&e two is the shape of an encounter in which transcendence 
comes to pass.
In the two, the other is absolutely unrelated to me. My en-
counter with the other doesn’t hang on empathy, for there isn’t 
an analogical bridge between us across which I might empa-
thize; there is no room for a “like” or “unlike” relation in the 
two. I can’t try the other’s shoes on for size; I can’t even make 
out their shoes. In the three-as-one, there are three terms — the 
self, the other, and the analogy as a whole — which are counted-
as-one under the aspect of the third, the analogy or atrocity. In 
the two, there are two terms — the self and the other — which 
are di(erent in kind from one another yet nevertheless encoun-
ter each another. &ey do this directly in the space of the two. 
It is in this way that I, in the two, am exposed to the other in 
their very otherness, without their subsumption under my cat-
egories of understanding or what is familiar to me. &ere isn’t a 
third under which the two terms could be counted-as-one, seen 
to be mere relata in a relationship taken to be primitive. &e 
other in the two is whatever it may be. It isn’t “for” the self. Af-
+iction is not transformed into atrocity, and we needn’t give up 
the endeavor to come to terms with the violence of our history: 
the two is very much a topology of the encounter, but one that 
consider further: Levinas’s distinction between the saying and the said (in 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis [Pitts-
burgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998]); Henry’s distinction between the 
+esh and the body or self-a)ection and noetic-noematic givenness (e.g., 
in Incarnation); and Lacan’s distinction between the real and reality. %is 
isn’t the place to try to carefully articulate the similarities and di)erences 
between these distinctions, though I hope to do that in future work. But let 
me just say this. In regard to the relationship between a&iction and atroc-
ity, it might be particularly interesting to think about how the former term 
in each of these distinctions undermines or undoes the latter term, while 
in one sense still preserving it as so undermined or undone.
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doesn’t operate via analogy and empathy. &is is why inhabiting 
it by way of remembrance, calling it to mind moment a*er mo-
ment, makes possible vigilant attention to a-iction. 
In dwelling in the two, I respond to the other’s call as what-
ever it may be. I don’t seek to comprehend the other “for” me, 
as a term of the analogy centered on me. I abnegate to the other, 
and there’s no symmetry between us. I don’t demand reciproc-
ity. I am responsible for the other in the two, called to be hospi-
table to that which is at an undecipherable height. I welcome an 
other whose sense isn’t of an order with which I am acquainted 
or comfortable. &e two doesn’t look like home. But the comfort 
and regularity of the three-as-one mask a certain angst. In seeing 
atrocity in a-iction’s place, we miss something excessive — the 
a-iction itself — which nevertheless calls us to bear witness to 
it. So in the regularity of atrocity, in our forgetfulness of a-ic-
tion, we feel in some way unable to really get a grip on the suf-
fering that +esh and blood people endured, the su(ering from 
which many of them perished. Seen in this light, our mourning 
appears to miss something. We feel an angst: this is the ache of 
our neglect. In attending to it, in following it and coming to see 
it as such, we can exit the three-as-one and inhabit the two, fac-
ing a-iction head on, encountering the a-icted in earnest in 
our open exposure to them. We can encounter them in our re-
sponsibility to bear witness to what they themselves underwent, 
not just to our vision of atrocity.
An attitude to the past’s calamities that sees them under the 
aspect of atrocity rests on the construction of an analogy re-
lating those who perished and a speci'c narrative about their 
a-iction. &e a-iction of the ordinary people who su(ered in 
Sétif and Guelma is subjected to the operation of the count-as-
x, which produces the unique number of the death toll. &is 
number signi'es and helps to carry the sense of the atrocity 
under which the a-iction is, through this process, subsumed. 
A-iction is primordial in relation to atrocity. It precedes atroc-
ity and is the material with which atrocity is built. And it is ob-
scured — forgotten — in atrocity’s construction. Atrocity is the 
original su(ering of those who died at Sétif and Guelma, outside 
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any analogy, made analogical. It is their agony transformed into 
the qualitative intensity of a particular persecution situated in 
a social and political context. &at is to say, an atrocity is the 
apparatus within which those who aren’t counted become sim-
ply what they are for those who count in the operation of the 
count-as-x, or for those who inherit this count and its sense. 
So atrocity is a-iction become more or less than what it is, no 
longer what it is in itself. It’s a sort of horror produced analogi-
cally in relating a communal or political narrative to those who 
perished such that the two can’t be understood in separation 
from one another. &is production goes on in a communal op-
eration of quanti'cation: the count that quanti'es and houses 
a certain quali'cation in a given number. &is operation yields 
the correlation of the living’s narrative and the dead, clothed in 
number, which comes to stand in for and gives sense to a-ic-
tion; the correlation permits no excess beyond what’s counted-
as-x and then counted-as-one, beyond what has already been 
quali'ed under the banner of atrocity or has been given its ad-
jectival mark, “atrocious.” 
So we can say that atrocity is a-iction converted through the 
count-as-x into a number that admits of no excess, in which the 
meaning of some historical horror is to be de'nitively made out. 
&e a-icted other is ensnared, made into a sort of 'nite, total-
ized idol of itself. It is the sense made of it. &e other is trans-
formed into only what is correlated with and inextricable from 
the narrative of the a-iction that has befallen them, and all this 
is within the overarching analogical structure of the atrocity. 
When this analogical structure, in which there are three 
terms (self, other, analogy), is taken to be prior to the two, the 
three-as-one is the result. &e three are then counted-as-one, 
and this involves the neglect of the two. &ere can’t be a two in 
which one could dwell, for the three-as-one is taken to come 
'rst, and it precludes the two from the start. &e forgetting of 
the two here is twofold: one forgets the two in taking the three-
as-one to be primary, and then one forgets this forgetting; this 
is essential for the maintenance of this position. &e inhabiting 
of the three-as-one is in this sense a lethargy with respect to 
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the space in which the genuine other — who isn’t determined 
by some identity perceived by me or attribute discerned by 
me — condemns me on pain of angst (that of leaving something 
out of my mourning) to a non-relational or asymmetrical abne-
gation. To live in the three-as-one is to look away.8 
Communal attitudes with respect to the horri'c events of 
history take an analogical form. &eir topology is that of the 
three. &ere are two terms, the living and the dead. And then 
there is the dual bridge between them:
1. the sense the living make of the dead, and
2. the way in which the dead’s su(ering a(ects how the living 
set out to live. 
Now the three, insofar as the two is neglected, is counted-as-
one. &e dead are taken to be inextricable from, and even iden-
tical to, the sense the living make of them. &e dead can’t ex-
ceed this, at least not in being thought. But the three needn’t 
be counted-as-one. Instead, it can admit of excess: namely, the 
excess of the two, which one can acknowledge as preceding the 
three. When this acknowledgment takes place, the two and the 
three — the topology of ethics and the topology of communi-
ty — can conceivably coexist.9 But this coexistence can happen 
8 %ere are two sets of remarks by Emmanuel Levinas worth considering 
in light of what I’m arguing here. First, those regarding the way in which 
the height of the other person, their in"nite distance from me and the fact 
that I’m irrecuperably responsible for them, is encountered in their hunger 
and poverty, their insu7ciency and nakedness. %is might be compared 
with the way in which the a&icted person’s otherness reveals itself as a 
destitution, as an inadequacy, within the sphere of analogy. See Emmanuel 
Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso 
Lingis (%e Hague: Martinus Nijho), 1969), 117, 200. Second, it’s worth 
considering those remarks made by Levinas about vigilance and insomnia, 
and their role in moral experience. See Levinas, Otherwise than Being or 
Beyond Essence, 87. On insomnia in particular, see Emmanuel Levinas, 
God, Death, and Time, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2000), 207–12.
9 %e relationship here between the topologies of the two and the three-
as-one bears some resemblance to the relationship between nonstandard 
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only when the two is taken to be the primordial topology. &at’s 
the only way for the three to not be counted-as-one. When the 
two is acknowledged as preceding the three, the three isn’t total-
izing, which means that the two and the three can then coexist 
(since there’s room for the two prior to the three). If the two and 
the three are considered simultaneous, or if the three is given 
primacy and thereby counted-as-one, the other is replaced by 
an analogical idol: the other who’s “for” the self, and nothing be-
sides. &e a-icted are taken to be nothing other than what they 
are under an atrocious description. If the two comes 'rst, how-
ever, the a-icted are 'rst what they really are, and only then are 
they — very partially, we’ll acknowledge — the sense that’s made 
of them. &is permits an apt humility regarding the sense we 
make of the past’s horrors. We introduce the possibility of real 
fallibility so far as atrocity goes in introducing the impossibility 
of getting a complete handle on a-iction under an atrocious 
aspect. But this doesn’t preclude a grip on a-iction itself, which 
is precisely what inhabiting the topology of the two, prior to the 
three, enables us to get. 
&e number generated in the operation of the count-as-
x traps the a-icted in a system — of sense, explanation, and 
mourning — in which they can di(er only in degree from those 
who are set as the norm of the analogy, the constituting cent-
er or mean of the atrocity: the living. For the French colonial 
government, those who perished at Sétif and Guelma were the 
1,020, just as they were the 45,000 for Radio Cairo. But what 
are they themselves, as ordinary people who endured substan-
tial trials and died in appalling violence? What are they besides 
these numbers, beyond the analogy? And how can we think the 
philosophy or non-philosophy and philosophy in the work of François 
Laruelle. See especially, François Laruelle, Principles of Non-Philosophy, 
trans. Nicola Rubczak and Anthony Paul Smith (London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2013). Similarly, it’s somewhat comparable to Lacoste’s distinc-
tion between being-before-God (or coram Deo) and Heidegger’s being-in-
the-world. See Jean-Yves Lacoste, Experience and the Absolute: Disputed 
Questions on the Humanity of Man, trans. Mark Raferty-Skehan (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2004).
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a-iction of these people without regard to what they’re taken to 
be or to count as? How can we understand them in distinction 
from what they are for the apparatus of atrocity under which 
they’ve been subsumed and within which they’ve been numeri-
cally crystallized as the 1,020 or the 45,000? How can we un-
think the distortion of the atrocity’s count-as-x and x = one so as 
to come to terms with a-iction itself? 
7. Counting, Angst, and Christ’s Cruci*xion 
Within the topology of the three-as-one, a-iction is under-
stood as atrocity, with no outside. It is given sense by a body 
count, in which that sense is symbolically housed. &e count-as-
x introduces a third term or set of relations that conjoin those 
who aren’t counted and those who count such that each term is 
indistinguishable from its sense within the greater milieu (the 
analogy itself). &e terms are only thinkable as parts within the 
whole, in view of the whole.
&ere are a great many historical examples of this: a-iction 
is quali'ed as atrocity by way of an operation of counting. A 
number is introduced, which stands in for and serves to aid in 
making sense of a-iction. &e a-iction of the Shoah, for in-
stance, is signi'ed numerically by the count-as-six-million. &e 
Shoah’s a-iction itself is thus subsumed under its correlated nu-
mericity. Five million is the unique number of the &irty Years’ 
War. &e Cambodian autogenocide is counted-as-two-million. 
And the Black Death, which took so many lives in Paris, is given 
analogically by the number 50,000. We see this pattern — the 
application of a count-as-x to the su(ering within a situation 
as it is seen from a speci'c point of view — just as much with 
pestilence and plague as with autos-da-fé, burnings at the stake, 
and drownings in the trials of witches. &e massacre that took 
place at Columbine High School is symbolized by the number 
15, which stands in for it. &is is less what it is (an atrocity) than 
the Salem witch trials, symbolized by the number 20, which is 
still less what it is than the violence that took place in Sétif and 
Guelma — which, symbolized by the number 1,020 or 45,000, is 
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therefore more what it is. Atrocity is the numbering and quali-
'cation of a-iction such that it can be more or less what it is. 
But this has a price: the resultant atrocity is only a shallow image 
of the a-iction, a hollow idol or statue. &e actual a-iction is 
reduced to what can be numbered and quali'ed, rendered intel-
ligible. In failing to acknowledge the count’s excess, and in fail-
ing to get a non-atrocious grip on that excess, we are le* with 
a sense of history’s horrors as intelligible. But this sense is skin-
deep. Our understanding of these horrors is facile at best, and 
it is o*en much more seriously warped by the thought that our 
vision of atrocity is wholly adequate to the relevant a-iction.
&e application of the count-as-x to the su(ering seen within 
a given situation is commonly a response to rather acute trau-
ma, or to the memory of this trauma and how it a(ected one or 
those proximal to one. In this way, one attempts to cope with 
what has occurred. But it is a strategy for coping with pernicious 
repercussions.10 &e numbering that crystallizes the atrocity qua 
atrocity, such that it is at least to some degree more psychologi-
cally bearable, leads to a condition of angst in which that crys-
tallization in number seems inescapable, exhaustive, and basic. 
Mourning comes to seem always incomplete. It looks always to 
be missing the real substance of what has happened, the a-ic-
tion itself. One is le* with a shallow number, a comprehensible 
but inevitably cursory sense of a set of violent events. &is sense 
always appears to lack depth. For despite the sense made of af-
10 To reiterate: I don’t say that this strategy involves a choice to neglect af-
+iction. For if one knew that one was forgetting a&iction (in so choosing) 
and instead focusing on atrocity, this forgetfulness and the resultant focus 
would be rather partial. %e coping strategy I have in mind here isn’t so 
much a choice as a failure to see or remember, one that in fact makes sense 
in the wake of traumatic events. So we need to be reminded to attend to 
a&iction, and then we need to work to maintain our vision of it, to stay 
vigilant. One can’t see a&iction and with it in view choose to see atrocity. 
%e strategy I have in mind, then, isn’t something one decides to pursue 
with a full view of what it entails; it’s only seen for what it is once one 
remembers a&iction, thereby coming to see what had previously gone on 
as neglect. 
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+iction as atrocity, the +esh and blood people who were actually 
a-icted are nowhere to be found. 
&e coping strategy that simpli'es what has happened by 
making an analogical construction (the atrocity) look exhaustive 
of the sense to be made of some horri'c set of events (through 
neglect) leads to a kind of chronic angst: we can’t 'gure out how 
to truly encounter the horrors of the past, or those who really 
su(ered them, and this a(ects how we’re able to live in light of 
what has happened. We create atrocity in the count-as-x in part 
to endure our apparent exemption from tragedy, to relieve the 
disquiet of the time a*er a cataclysm that’s not quite our own. 
&e count is an attempt to make atrocity as much our own as is 
possible. But we alleviate the fear and trembling of facing up to 
a-iction in this manner only at the cost of angst. &e dreadful 
stasis of the number of a body count, the 'xity of the atrocity 
and its narrative, seems to cure the fear that we too are merely 
pathetic +esh, or that the other’s a-iction is ours too, since we 
are responsible and already exposed in the other’s su(ering. But 
it does this by aiding us in forgetting both the self (the living) 
itself and the other (the dead), helping us to turn away from 
the two and toward the three. It makes it easier for us to take 
the three to be primary and so to totalize it as one. We trade 
the risk of having to come to terms with who we are and who 
the a-icted were, the risk of abnegation in the two, for what at 
'rst glance looks to be the comfort of analogy. We trade this 
risk for what’s de'nitively circumscribed. But really, we trade it 
for what turns out to be a condition of chronic, seemingly in-
exorable angst. &e view according to which there’s nothing im-
aginable outside the atrocity, beyond the scope of the analogy, 
is certainly a cure (however short-term); but it has a price that 
proves to be disastrously high. As with auto'ction, the solipsism 
in which everything has to be related to oneself in order to be 
comfortably intelligible winds up being stale and angst-ridden. 
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Once we’ve taken it on, it is something we try — without at 'rst 
knowing how — to escape.11 
Consider the Shoah, a set of horrors we’re o*en wisely coun-
seled to never forget. &e a-iction of the Shoah, in the operation 
of the count-as-six-million, becomes something that is no long-
er the su(ering of ordinary people (whatever they may be) who 
are distinct from the sense the living make of them. It becomes 
an atrocity, in what I’ll call the “as such” mode. &e Shoah is tak-
en as such, in its entirety, to be the atrocity made of it. Nothing 
of the a-iction of the Shoah is seen to transcend the atrocity. 
&e a-iction becomes clothed in the numeric, which is the re-
sult of the count-as-x, and it is rendered univocally intelligible, 
which is the result of the x = one. &e number, x, is the totaliza-
tion of the a-iction in quantity, by way of which it is quali'ed 
under an atrocious description (counted-as-one). Hence, it is a 
totalization of the a-icted as what they are “for” the living who 
look back on them from a particular point of view. &e a-icted 
are just the totality of what bears the relevant “for” relation (this 
can be made up of whatever set of “like” or “unlike” relations) 
to those who retrospect and see an atrocity. &e a-iction of or-
dinary people “as they are” becomes the atrocity of victims “as 
such.” I will contrast the “as they are” mode of these people with 
11 For some criticisms of the contemporary trend of auto"ction, particularly 
in French literature, see Sandra Laugier’s interview with Tristan Garcia 
in BOMB 114. Auto"ction is a genre or style of writing that imagines that 
a writer should stay within their own context, or should write only about 
what they know, not going beyond the limits of the familiar or self-same. 
As a style of writing, I don’t think that auto"ction is universally objection-
able. But I "nd the idea that one can’t or shouldn’t seek to write about what 
one isn’t personally acquainted with, that one can’t or shouldn’t want to 
write about others, profoundly objectionable, both because it turns "ction 
into solipsism, ruining much of what’s absorbing and edifying in literature, 
and because it sets up a putative norm without any argument. One might 
compare what I say here, too, with Derrida’s famous statement that “there 
is no outside-text.” See Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 
158. I develop the claim that a seeming lack of any outside leads to a condi-
tion of angst, and that this condition can be abrogated in abnegation, in 
my forthcoming Angst and Abnegation. 
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their mode “as such,” which is just to contrast the a-icted with 
those seen to be victims of atrocity while stressing that the same 
people are essentially at issue on both contrasting sides. 
From within the analogical structure of an atrocity, it doesn’t 
seem sensible to so much as inquire as to whether the a-icted 
person as they are is in fact totalized, crystallized in the number 
of the fatality count. It doesn’t seem to make sense, either, to ask 
whether they are beyond the analogy, themselves indi(erent to 
it. &e question of whether the person as they are, as a-icted, is 
totalized doesn’t so much as come to mind. A*er all, the num-
ber of the person as such — one out of 1,020, say — stands in for 
the person as they are; it is taken to be primary, originary. &e 
a-icted person’s indi(erence to the atrocity’s number, the dis-
tance between the real person who is a-icted and the person 
who is one out of 1,020, can only be seen in the remembrance of 
the topology of the two. For in inhabiting the two, one can look 
toward the atrocity’s number with a certain indi(erence, attend-
ing instead to the a-icted as they are. One catches sight of those 
who aren’t counted in a recollection of the two, against the am-
nesia that enables and results in the three-as-one and the angst 
that manifests within the analogy counted-as-one. Indi(erence 
to the three-as-one is possible in connection with an attitude for 
which atrocity doesn’t su,ce. One sees atrocity to be lacking, 
emphasizing the angst of the three-as-one, and one then follows 
this to the recollection of the two — the exit from analogy. &e 
remembrance of the a-icted person, against atrocity’s angst and 
neglect, in a sense mirrors the a-icted person’s own indi(er-
ence to the atrocity’s number (which will only be constituted in 
hindsight).12 
12 In After Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux writes that what is beyond the 
correlational circle — for us, beyond the topology of the three-as-one — in 
some sense resembles the “great outdoors” sought by pre-critical philoso-
phy, that “outside which was not relative to us, and which was indifferent to 
its own givenness to be what it is, existing in itself regardless of whether we 
are thinking it or not.” %e idea of indi)erence here is this. What is beyond 
the correlation between thinking and being, what exists whether or not we 
are thinking or positing it, is in a certain sense indi)erent to us, foreclosed 
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I want now to turn to a particularly salient instance of the 
count-as-x, which is the root of much of its cultural and his-
torical resilience as a method for comprehending great su(er-
ing. I have in mind the cruci'xion of Christ, or the sense that 
was made of it by those who came a*er Christ. We can pull the 
a-iction apart from the atrocity quite easily in this case. On 
the one hand, there is Christ’s su(ering itself. Christ, a +esh and 
blood person, bore the cross. On the other hand, there is the 
Pauline application of the count-as-x to this su(ering such that 
it is transformed into an atrocity. &is is the generative process 
through which the apparatus of Christianity as an analogical 
system (I’ll come to this shortly) is produced. In this light, we 
can see the resurrection and ascension of Christ as the atrocious 
a*ere(ects of his a-iction. &ey are the resultant narrative 
events of the count-as-x’s application to a cruci'xion which, as 
a-iction, stands beyond any narrative that might be attached to 
it by the living. &e count-as-x is applied by Paul to the a-iction 
of Christ, which yields a count-as-one; x = one, and this “one” is 
the identity of Christ — the univocal set of qualities given ana-
logically (“for-y”) — as he is “for” Christians, within the analogy 
as a whole (Christianity). In being applied to Christ’s a-iction, 
the count-as-x yields the atrocious 'gure of Christ “for” Chris-
tians within Christianity. I will refer to this 'gure as “Christ-in-
Christianity.” First, this 'gure is “Christ-for-Paul.”
Now the conversional road to Damascus that follows, and 
the spread of Christianity which follows that, is predicated on 
this primary conversion: that of the cruci'xion into the ascen-
sion, that of the a-iction of Christ himself (I will refer to him as 
to the determinations of thought. In being ourselves indi)erent to such 
determinations, in treating the analogical with a certain ascesis, and as I’ll 
suggest in showing a particular sort of hospitality to the other person as 
an other, we can get a grip on what is beyond the three-as-one. As Meil-
lassoux’s outside stands apart from what’s inextricable from thought, the 
a&icted person is, beyond the analogical, foreclosed to our attempts to 
make sense of the past through a count of bodies and atrocity’s constitu-
tion. Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of 
Contingency, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008), 7.
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“Christ-without-Christianity”) into Christ-in-Christianity. For 
it is through this conversion that Christ the a-icted is count-
ed-as-one, a conversion to which the events of the resurrection 
and ascension narratively attest. Christ is counted-as-one in the 
construction of the analogy we call “Christianity,” an analogy in 
which Christ himself can’t exist as distinct. &ere are three terms 
in it: Christ, the Christian, and the dual bridge between them 
(Christianity). Christ is “for” the Christian, made intelligible as 
Christ-in-Christianity under the aspect of a narrative of atroc-
ity (and salvation). &e Christian is “for” Christ; she makes her 
life in the light of what happened to him and the sense she has 
made of this. Neither term can be thought in separation from 
the other; all are understood only within the analogy, Christian-
ity itself. But this means that there is, to put it crudely, no Christ 
in Christianity. &ere’s only Christ-in-Christianity in Christian-
ity, and that isn’t the same thing. Christ-without-Christianity, 
like the a-icted, is forgotten in the constitution of atrocity or 
Christ-in-Christianity. &e ascension, as the end to which the 
cruci'xion (understood atrociously) points, is the narrative re-
sult of the Pauline application of the count-as-one, which turns 
Christ as someone who su(ered a-iction into the primary sym-
bol of a new analogical schema: Christianity. &e last is, as it 
were, made 'rst.13 Christ is then only what he is within Christi-
anity’s apparatus, from which he can’t be separated. He is merely 
Christ-in-Christianity. 
&is 'gure, who is in the “as such” mode identi'ed above, 
gets in the way of an ethical impulse in humanity that I believe 
to be among our most admirable: attention to the a-icted, hos-
pitality to them as they are — or to put it instead in somewhat 
apophatic terms, the welcoming of those who transcend atroc-
ity. In our neglect, Christ-without-Christianity as an example of 
the +esh and blood a-icted person to whom we might attend 
(which could 'gure in moral education and practice) is replaced 
by Christ-in-Christianity.
13 “So the last shall be "rst, and the "rst last: for many be called but few 
chosen.” Matthew 20:16 (King James Version).
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&is is representative, in a historically and culturally for-
midable way, of the forgetting of the two in favor of the three, 
which is thereby counted-as-one. &e humility with which one 
answers the call of another, with which one welcomes a stranger 
at the door or faces the a-ictions of the deceased, is replaced 
with egoistic projection, empathy, and the gra*ing of analogical 
relational properties (or “likes” and “unlikes”) onto the stranger 
whose face one doesn’t recognize. &e ordinary person as they 
are, who can be a-icted and who isn’t counted, who is fore-
closed to analogy and indi(erent to their atrocious position, is 
forgotten in the movement from the two to the three-as-one. 
One potent example of this is the movement from the cruci-
'xion, the a-iction of Christ-without-Christianity, to the as-
cension, which is predicated on the atrocity in which Christ is 
intelligible as Christ-in-Christianity. &at atrocity is the product 
of the count-as-one, and it in turn makes possible the Pauline 
conversional project, since it constitutes the analogy — Christi-
anity — within which the converted are to identify themselves as 
a term, as Christians. 
&e a-iction of the cruci'xion becomes an atrocity, which 
is the material cause of the ascension and for which the ascen-
sion is in some sense the 'nal cause. Once again, the last be-
comes the 'rst. Where there was an a-icted person, there is 
now a person inseparable from a narrative about their a-iction, 
inseparable from those who tell this narrative and pass it on. 
Christ-without-Christianity becomes Christ-in-Christianity. 
And Christ himself is set to one side, since he falls outside the 
bounds of the operative analogy. Christ is made into the 'rst 
principle of a new order, Christianity, and is thinkable only as 
positioned within that new order.14 It is an order that he himself 
14 Relatedly, Christ is o3en seen as the archetypal child, and thus as the seat 
of salvation insofar as the reproduction that brings about the next genera-
tion saves. His infancy is seen to represent deliverance. %is Irenaean 
Christianity involves a sort of reproductive futurism, which always puts 
deliverance beyond what’s presently possible (this is characteristic of any 
eschatological ethic). Salvation is imagined to be a work of time, and 
morality consists in a project of hope in some distant advent whose very 
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didn’t know — indeed, couldn’t have known. For atrocity is al-
ways constituted in retrospection, in attending to the a-icted as 
they are “for” the living or in the “as such” mode.15 Christ exists, 
having been counted-as-one, only as the source of Paul’s novel 
analogy, as what he is “for” Paul. Paul can instigate the spread 
of Christianity only because this has taken place, only because 
Christ is no longer himself. &at Christ who isn’t counted is tied 
to the Christian (or originally, Paul) who counts, constituting 
an apparatus in which neither Christ nor the Christian can be 
thought in distinction from one another. Outside this relation, 
there is no Christ. Nor is there a Christian. Outside the identi'-
cation of Christ and the Christian as terms, there is no relation 
(Christianity). 
Here, we can clearly see the prima facie aporetic struc-
ture of analogy. &e three of the three-as-one demands two 
terms — Christ and the Christian, say — themselves. It can’t 
come into being without them. But the two terms demand the 
introduction of a third, without which they can’t be thought. 
&ere is a way in which the two terms must be taken as primi-
tive, and they then go on to be related. But, from the view on 
which their relation is primary, there’s a way in which the terms 
couldn’t be taken as primitive (or as non-terms). &e two terms 
seem, at least, to cry out for analogy such that they can be made 
possibility grants signi"cation to present action (including reproduc-
tive action). In §10, I argue that, contrary to this eschatological sense of 
salvation, deliverance is always of the order of the presently possible. So 
far as reproductive futurism in Christianity goes, we might also consider 
the symbolic work of the ritual of baptism as spiritual rebirth. Cf. Lee 
Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2004).
15 What’s crucial in this retrospection isn’t temporal (or spatial) distance. 
Atrocity can be seen at whatever temporal distance and can even be 
projected onto future possibilities. Instead, what’s crucial is the sort of 
distance from a&iction one "nds in its neglect, a kind of moral distance 
from which other people look assimilable and their su)ering quanti"able 
and comprehensible. When I say that atrocity is seen in “retrospection,” I 
mean to suggest this distance: one sees atrocity essentially from afar, such 
that forgetfulness can come between one and one’s perspicuous vision of 
a&iction.
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intelligible. &ey are thus counted-as-one. Yet the three-as-one, 
in its angst and aporia, enjoins us to inhabit a two that it requires 
(as the angst and aporia show) but cannot remember. 
8. No Matter What
&e count-as-x forgets the two. In subjecting a-iction to it, 
one neglects the primacy of the space in which one welcomes 
the other as they are — not because of their given qualities, or 
because of their relation to one, nor despite their position or 
identity within the analogical schema. One forgets the space 
in which one is hospitable to the other without regard to what 
they are “for” one. I’ll call the person who is forgotten, who is 
the other in the two, the person “no matter what.” &at’s just to 
say that they aren’t what one makes of them. &ey aren’t wel-
comed because one appreciates their qualities, nor despite what 
one takes their analogical position to be — but rather, no matter 
what. When one forgets the two, one forgets the person no mat-
ter what, and then this forgetting. 
I will call the mode of the other as they are, and not as they 
are “for” me or “as such,” “the fashion of the no matter what.” 
&e other in the fashion of the no matter what is whosoever they 
are, beyond the analogy. &ey are the one I welcome in the to-
pology of the two, the one who makes a claim on me, for whom 
I’m responsible, the one whose a-iction I am to remember. 
&is person is secondarily enmeshed in an analogical milieu, 
as Christ qua Christ-in-Christianity is, and the secondariness 
of this is o*en forgotten (yielding a three-as-one, or atrocity). 
But 'rst, an ordinary person is no matter what. &ey are not 
placed in an analogy from the start, though this priority can be 
neglected.
So the person who is a-icted is a person no matter what, 
while the person understood under the aspect of atrocity is 
a person who is more or less than what they are, a person “as 
such.” 
Now the other person in the fashion of the no matter what 
is absolutely di(erent from me. &ey are beyond any analogical 
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net I can cast. Recall that I can’t relate to the other in the two. I 
am exposed to them directly, responsible, but without relation 
or reciprocity. I am here for the other, condemned to them. All 
I can say in the two is “here I am!”16 Beckett tells us that we ex-
ist in the accusative case, for others, in the eyes of strangers or 
in responding to what they say.17 But it is more than this. In the 
two, I exist in the dative case. I’m summoned by the other to 
be hospitable. I am not “for” the other in the sense of analogy’s 
“for.” Rather, I am this direct, non-analogical exposure to the 
other.
I am, from the very start, an exposure to the other — who’s 
sometimes a-icted, who sometimes calls out for help, to whose 
call I am always already commanded to respond. In the two, I 
exist in the presence of what isn’t me, what isn’t of me, to which 
I can’t hope to relate. I abnegate, welcoming the other person 
no matter what, attending to them as they are. &is is the ba-
sis of any unsel'sh love.18 &e two is a space characterized by a 
welcome o(ered no matter what. &e attitude that makes pos-
sible its inhabiting takes this shape: I remember the two and 
thus come to inhabit it with respect to others whom I no longer 
take to be totalized in whatever analogical schema. I thus see the 
others as they are, and I see a-iction and can bear witness to 
it, where before I saw only atrocity, always tied up with myself. 
In order to throw the axiom that structures the topology of 
the two into starker relief, an axiom I have been calling the “no 
matter what,” we can consider the ethic in which it arises. I will 
call this the “generic ethic.” We can think about the shape of a 
life dedicated to the hospitality that characterizes the two, a life 
in which one bears witness to a-iction rather than atrocity. And 
16 Cf. 1 Samuel 3:4. See also Emmanuel Levinas, The Levinas Reader, ed. Seán 
Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), esp. 104, 166, 182, 184, 207.
17 Samuel Beckett, Stories and Texts for Nothing (New York: Grove Press, 
1967), 91. 
18 I discuss hospitality and love in more depth in “On Neighborly and Pref-
erential Love in Kierkegaard’s Works of Love,” Journal of Philosophy and 
Scripture 8 (Summer 2019).
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we can further ask about how a philosophical exploration of this 
sort of life, a theoretical consideration of it, might go. 
A philosophical system, a set of views and a manner of ap-
proaching philosophical questions, is perhaps best di(erenti-
ated from other systems by the question of what is at stake for 
it. For Descartes, it is the possibility of knowledge that is most at 
stake: knowledge of the self, the external world, God, and other 
people. I think, I am. For Michel Henry, like Descartes, it is also 
this possibility, and that of the self-impressional life that pre-
cedes it and is its condition. I feel myself thinking, I am, and only 
then can I know about the world. For Simone Weil, it is because 
I can act — and thinking is a sort of activity — that I am. I con-
stitute what I am to be in the moment of action. For Kant, the 
thing that’s most at stake is the limit, the law of thinking in the 
'rst instance (quid juris?), which prohibits the speculative dis-
eases of the head and leads us toward a putatively preferable re-
gion of thinking. &e ontological question (about the nature of 
things-in-themselves) is put on the table only as an empty pos-
sibility. Instead of asking about what something is, the critical 
philosophy tells us that we must instead ask about the possibility 
conditions for a thing to appear to us as it does. For Heidegger, 
it is being as such, and one’s relation to it as Dasein, that is at 
stake — especially, it is the question of being, which has for so 
long been obliviated. &ere’s a sense in which this is a return to 
the question of ontology, for we are to inquire into being itself. 
But we can only do this, we’re told, through an existential ana-
lytic of Dasein. So being and thinking, as in Kant, are correlated 
in our being-in-the-world. We can only think being by thinking 
of ourselves, proceeding from thought (and always from with-
in thought outward). For Quentin Meillassoux, what’s at stake 
is the perhaps, a sort of chance or chaos (the only necessity). 
Contingency is absolute, and it renders instability itself liable 
to change. For Alain Badiou, we are a*er a new conception of 
being or what is, a new conception of the event or what hap-
pens, and an understanding of the relationship between these. 
What’s at stake is the subject and its relationship — of 'delity 
or betrayal — to evental truths. For each of these philosophers, 
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there is something centrally at stake, and they approach their 
investigations, in posing questions and setting out views, with 
this in mind. &ere is something about which they endeavor to 
get clear, which structures the inquiries undertaken. Or to put it 
another way: there is some theme that gives their philosophical 
work a particular character and shapes the path it takes. 
For the generic ethic, which seeks to get clear about the to-
pology of the two and the shape of the life of the person who 
inhabits it, what’s at stake is abnegation. &e project is to o(er 
a new conception of allegiance, a sense of what it would mean 
to vigilantly recollect the two and to thereby avoid the angst of 
the three-as-one. O*en, this angst is produced in the following 
way. We take on an ontology that forbids the existence of genu-
ine others, since those with whom we relate can only be made 
sense of (we come to believe) insofar as they’re correlated with 
us. We can’t hope to think things-in-themselves, so the alter-
ity of other people is only ever conceivably relative to us. Yet 
our ethical sensibility demands the existence of real others. &e 
categorical imperative requires that, all else aside, we treat other 
people in a certain way. In Aquinas, one 'nds talk of virtuous 
relations to others. And in Bentham, one 'nds a clear concern 
with how one’s actions a(ect other people. Our ethical sensibil-
ity (whatever framework for thinking about normative ethics 
is on o(er) seems to demand others who can’t be thought, at 
least insofar as we inhabit a three-as-one. So it isn’t surprising 
that this results in a condition of angst, as our sense of the good 
forces us to run up against the cage of the ontology we’ve taken 
on, in which other people aren’t really other. &ose philosophi-
cal systems that operate with a three-as-one structure rule out 
the existence of any other, but very o*en they still demand that 
we treat the other in a given way, with reference to certain prin-
ciples or maxims or virtues. &is generates a condition of angst, 
since in moving from ontology to ethics we seem to require oth-
ers whose existence has already been called into question, and 
at the very best set to one side or bracketed, from the start. &e 
generic ethic instead proceeds from ethics, beginning with the 
two — the primordial ethical scene — and the welcoming of the 
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other for whom one is called to responsibility. In remembering 
the two, one comes to inhabit it anew and again, and the angst of 
the mixture of a three-as-one with an ethical wish to treat sup-
posedly nonexistent others a certain way is abrogated. 
A philosophical elaboration of the generic ethic involves, 
then, a new thought of devotion or welcoming, in some sense 
a new thought of piety.19 For it, the question at hand isn’t about 
freedom but 'delity, not choice but commitment: the commit-
ment to a hospitality to others that makes freedom in the so-
cial world then conceivable.20 It is in the three-as-one, a*er all, 
that one is unfree, tied always to the other, subsumed always 
under the operative analogy, identi'ed as a mere analogical 
term. &e generic ethic asks, what would it mean to welcome 
not just the old friend but also the absolute stranger? Would it 
be a sentimental vision in which one must capitulate one’s self 
to the stranger’s identity, giving in even when they, say, harm 
others? Or would it be a welcoming only of the non-qualitative 
stranger, the stranger beyond the analogy, and in that sense a 
non-capitulation to those present elements which, as qualitative 
or analogical, then impose qualities onto others?21 How can we 
19 For as Simone Weil writes, “Today it is not nearly enough merely to be a 
saint, but we must have the saintliness demanded by the present moment, 
a new saintliness, itself also without precedent.” Simone Weil, Waiting for 
God, trans. Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009), 51. We 
are in need of a new ethic for a new guard and a new age, which in truth is 
always a new way of remembering, of "xing one’s eyes upon the good. 
20 Cf. Levinas, The Levinas Reader, 210n10: “Freedom means, therefore, the 
hearing of a vocation which I am the only person able to answer — or 
even the power to answer right there, where I am called.” See additionally 
Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, esp. 123–24.
21 To be sure, abnegation to others no matter what o3en demands that we 
don’t capitulate to the acts of analogical quality-imposition in which some 
other engages. Hospitality demands that we don’t tolerate totalization, 
and in fact hospitality to the totalizing other demands that we reject his 
totalizing, that we take a stand against it. For example: if we are going to 
welcome a transphobe and someone who is transgender, we’ll have to "ght 
in the name of the no matter what against the imposition of qualities (the 
transgender person “for” the transphobe, say) in which the transphobe 
engages in their hatred. Abnegation isn’t a passivity opposed to taking 
a stand; it’s not a weakness that would somehow prevail over force, or a 
151
THOSE WHO AREN’T COUNTED
abnegate to the stranger, welcoming them in a no matter what 
fashion, without regard to their relation to us or their place in 
some analogical schema? &ese are the questions that the ge-
neric ethic has to ask. 
Setting aside, for a moment, talk of qualities, topologies, and 
so on, the question for the generic ethic is altogether straightfor-
ward: what would it mean to live with allegiance to other people 
as others, to live hospitably and welcome in a no matter what 
fashion? To put it another way: what would it mean to live in 
steadfast devotion to +esh and blood strangers, who are in'-
nitely di(erent from oneself?
&e main axiom of such an allegiance or devotion, of an ab-
negation that bears witness to ordinary people and their pos-
sible a-iction, is the “no matter what.” Being in the fashion of 
the no matter what means being outside any analogy; being or-
dinary, +esh and blood, not “for” the other terms of an atrocity, 
not counted-as-x. In the topology of the two, I welcome another 
no matter what, without regard to the positions they occupy 
in whatever analogies. What I welcome no matter what is the 
other person no matter what, the person who isn’t a term of an 
analogy. So the no matter what structures the topology of the 
two, de'ning how the self in the two relates, via a welcoming 
of absolute alterity, to the other. Welcoming no matter what is 
relating to what’s utterly exterior; it is a relating that is wholly 
non-analogical (and so in a certain sense, non-relational). &e 
no matter what describes the piety of the space in which I en-
pathos that disavows power or strength. It o3en requires that, in showing 
a hospitality to the totalizing other, we don’t capitulate to their totaliza-
tion. Even St. Paul tells us that there’s bene"cent combat. In the abnegation 
of the generic ethic, resistance to quality-imposition is the other side of 
responsibility and hospitality; non-capitulation is one’s response to the 
particular situation of abnegation to another who engages in colonizing 
acts of quality-imposition onto their own others. Here, it is the imposition 
that is refused so that each other can be welcomed as they are. I discuss 
this at greater length in “To Not Lose Sight of the Good: Notes on the 
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counter an other who can’t be assimilated to what’s self-same, 
an other who isn’t di(erent only in degree from the norm that I 
am. &is is an other for whom the addition of analogical quali-
ties is a subtraction of alterity. In placing the other under an 
atrocious description, I take away their in'nite alterity — or I 
presume to do that. &is subtraction is a move from in'nity to 
'nitude, from the real otherness of other people to the 'nite 
bundles of qualities under which I subsume them. &e resultant 
others “for” me are not others at all but of the same. In this way, 
I forget the other who is in the fashion of the no matter what, 
who precedes and is foreclosed to the other “for” me. Inhabiting 
the two consists in remembering this originary other and my 
abnegation to them, my responsibility to welcome them without 
regard to any analogy.
&e generic ethic is generic in this sense: the other is not to be 
welcomed under the aspect of the particular, welcomed because 
of some quality deemed admirable or despite some attribute to 
be brushed aside. &e other is welcomed no matter what, ge-
nerically — but that’s to say, in their singularity, as whatever they 
really are. In the generic ethic, genericity and singularity come 
together. Now for the generic ethic, which welcomes without 
regard to qualities or analogical positions, the no matter what 
is the axiom that founds and structures the topology of the two. 
&is in turn makes possible a three, an analogy, that isn’t total-
izing or counted-as-one. &e axiom of the two, in being remem-
bered as primary, makes possible the coexistence of the two and 
the topology of the three; this three acknowledges the priority of 
the two, and it therefore doesn’t see analogy as exhaustive (it is 
the shape an ethical community takes). &ere is a sense in which 
the generic ethic is thus pre-communal, though it is required for 
a particular form of the communal, namely, the three that can 
coexist with the two. &e two of the consequent topology, a to-
pology I’ll call the “coexistent two-and-three,” coexists as before, 
and then alongside, or as alongside because before, the three.22 
22 %ere’s a way in which the topology of the coexistent two-and-three that 
I’m elaborating could be understood as an attempt to resolve some of the 
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&e generic ethic is the ground in the last instance of a commu-
nity that is open to others, hospitable, non-totalizing. It is what, 
at the end of the day, renders any community that acknowledges 
its priority inhabitable — and not only for those who are proxi-
mal enough to the operative norms to 't in. 
&e no matter what functions as a razor that cuts from the 
three-as-one to the two. Welcoming no matter what means re-
membering the person who is in its fashion, which then permits 
the coexistence of the two with the three in the topology of the 
coexistent two-and-three. &e person no matter what is origi-
nary vis-à-vis the position of this person within an analogy, a 
position that becomes totalizing if it is taken to be primary or 
su,cient unto itself. So we can understand the operation of the 
count-as-x as an imagining of the three’s self-su,ciency (count-
ed-as-one), and as a condensation of this su,ciency in a num-
ber that gives voice to the atrocity and its meaning for the living. 
&e thought that atrocity su,ces for a-iction is given in a-ic-
tion’s crystallization in the unique number of the fatality count. 
&e count-as-x is a twofold forgetting of the primacy of the two, 
the ethical, as the topology in which the axiom of the no matter 
what is at work. One forgets the topology in which the self (the 
living) abnegates to the unassimilable other (the a-icted, the 
dead) who is a person no matter what, and then one forgets this 
forgetting. Welcoming no matter what cuts from the person as 
aporetic tension in Leibniz’s “Monadology.” (Although, to be sure, this 
topology doesn’t map neatly onto Leibniz’s project.) %e two of the topol-
ogy of the two-and-three is something like the Leibnizian monad, insofar 
as it is self-contained and not open to determination by what goes on in 
the three; it has “no windows” (though it is where transcendence comes to 
pass). %e three of this topology is the saturation of each monad with rela-
tions to all monads, which is total in the three counted-as-one but partial 
in the three of the two-and-three. %e three conceives of its monads as “all 
windows,” or even as only windows to other monads. I have been arguing 
for the coexistence of the two and the three insofar as the two precedes the 
three and is foreclosed to it (i.e., insofar as the saturation is seen as partial 
in the remembrance of the two). Cf. G.W. Leibniz, “%e Principles of Phi-
losophy, or, the Monadology (1714),” in Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans. 
Roger Ariew and Dan Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989), 213–25. 
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such to the person as they are. One gets a grip on the a-icted 
themselves only by way of hospitality. Forgetting the person as 
they are leads to an understanding of the other under the aspect 
of the same, the analogical. &e no matter what leads back from 
this atrocity to a-iction. To inhabit the generic ethic is to keep 
this in mind, to vigilantly recollect the two and welcome the af-
+icted in the fashion of the no matter what.
9. 'e Cruci*xion of Christ No Matter What
Now that we have a better grasp of the generic ethic, I want to 
return to that culturally and historically signi'cant instance 
of the count-as-x which we’ve been considering: the cruci'x-
ion of Christ himself, whose being counted-as-one, originally 
by Paul, was in some sense the precondition of the ascension 
and Christianity’s spread. &e a-iction of Christ’s cruci'xion 
is transformed into an atrocity such that the ascension can be 
made sense of. &is transformation happens by way of an un-
derstanding of Christ as Christ-in-Christianity or Christ as 
such, produced in the count-as-one. An understanding of the 
cruci'xion as atrocity follows this quanti'cation, the identi'ca-
tion of Christ as the atrocity’s “one.” So the count-as-x mediates 
between a-iction and atrocity, producing the “one” of the as-
cension’s Christ.
In a certain sense, Christ-without-Christianity, or Christ no 
matter what, is immediate. He is not mediated by the count-
as-x and x = one, turned into the Christ-in-Christianity of the 
atrocity. Christ no matter what thus underdetermines or un-
dermines what transforms him into someone in an atrocious 
position — the analogical Christ — which isn’t himself in the 
fashion of the no matter what. &e Christ who is just himself, 
who is a-icted without atrocity, is at an in'nite distance from 
his mediated posture; Christ-without-Christianity is an in'n-
ity away from Christ-in-Christianity, since between these two 
is the gulf that divides the analogical from the non-analogical. 
Christ-without-Christianity is indi(erent to his intra-analogical 
position. And the recollection of the two roots, for us, an at-
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tunement of indi(erence toward this position. &is recollection 
is the application of the razor of the no matter what, which in a 
sort of ascesis strips away the analogical qualities of an ordinary 
person so as to reveal their radical insu,ciency from within the 
perspective of analogy — so as to reveal, in some cases, the af-
+icted as they are. &is razor of absolute hospitality cuts away 
the self-indulgence in which one’s attributive or empathetic 
view of the other is taken to su,ce for the other as such. In the 
case we’ve been considering, that self-indulgent view is bound 
up with the analogical matrix of Christianity. It is a view of 
Christ as Christ-in-Christianity.
&e cruci'xion as the a-iction of Christ no matter what 
is subject to the count-as-x by Paul. &is is the production of 
the Christ who is Christianity’s subject, counted-as-one within 
its analogical schema. Only a*er this production of the Christ 
subject can the ascension of Christ and the conversional road 
to Damascus take place, insofar as they are analogical events 
predicated on the inextricable correlation of Christ no matter 
what (the originary, +esh and blood person in the two) and Paul 
(the counter) in a correlation that comes to be known, in being 
inhabited by more and more people, as “Christianity.” It is “for” 
Paul that the a-iction of Christ becomes the atrocity at Chris-
tianity’s heart. &e road to Damascus is in this sense the road 
of a-iction become atrocity. It involves the imposition of the 
analogical milieu of Christianity onto Christ such that there can 
be, for this analogy and its constitutive terms, no Christ himself. 
Christianity is, at bottom, the name given to the colonization of 
Christ by Paul and those who inherit and inhabit his construc-
tion. 
Now that we have Christianity’s topological structure in view, 
can we theorize instead with the Christ of the cruci'xion, with 
that Christ whose a-iction is foreclosed to the determinations 
of atrocity? Can we set aside the operation of the count-as-x and 
the production of the atrocity of Christ-in-Christianity? Can we 
be allegiant in thought to Christ as he is, rather than to Christ 
as such? Can we, to put it plainly, refuse to put the analogical 
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before the ethical, refuse to forget the a-iction of Christ in the 
neglect of the two and the inhabiting of the three-as-one? 
Christianity as constituted by Paul is the analogical result of 
the count-as-x that renders Christ himself Christ-in-Christian-
ity and the Christian what they are merely “for” Christ. In the 
totalization of Christianity, the only existent sense of Christ no 
matter what is Christ as such. And the Christian as such can be 
the only existent sense of the Christian as they are. Christ-in-
Christianity and the Christian-in-Christianity can’t be thought 
apart from their relationship. Neither term can be understood 
beyond the limit of the analogy of Christianity itself. &e atroc-
ity of the mediated Christ is simply one of the correlate objects 
of an analogical construction built by a count. &is atrocity’s 
sense is crystallized in the unique number of x; in the case of the 
cruci'xion, this number is one. &e twice forgetting of a-iction 
by those who count makes the position of a-iction as atroc-
ity within the analogical milieu intelligible — and angst aside, 
somewhat sustainable. Christ himself, though, is at a distance 
from the analogical position into which he’s put as part and par-
cel of the three-as-one. Recast against the three-as-one from the 
two, Christ no matter what is in'nitely other. We move from 
the three-as-one to the two by applying the ascetic razor of the 
no matter what, by recollecting the primacy of the two and our 
responsibility for the other in it. We thus move from Christ-in-
Christianity to Christ-without-Christianity, the latter of whom 
is in'nitely di(erent from the former. &e other in the two is 
absolutely other than what they are in the three-as-one. We see 
this in the recasting of Christ himself against his secondary (but 
forgotten as such and taken to be primary) position in the three-
as-one.
&e other is the organon of deliverance from atrocity, for the 
remembrance and witnessing of the analogical non-position of 
the a-icted Christ himself, who is indi(erent to his position in 
the atrocity, delivers us from the three-as-one to the two. &is 
is a deliverance from analogy and its angst. And in coming to 
remember the primacy of the two, we make possible the coex-
istent two-and-three (that is, the coexistence of the topologies 
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of ethics and community), since the three can only coexist with 
the two in which there’s a legitimate other, not di(erent from 
the self only in degree, if it’s seen to be secondary to the two. &e 
messianic promise of Christ as a +esh and blood insu,ciency 
of qualities when seen from within the analogy is predicated on 
Christ in the fashion of the no matter what.23 &is essentially 
undergirds the qualitative accident of Christ-in-Christianity’s 
analogical position. And what is salvation if not from the to-
talization of this accident (the thought that it isn’t accidental but 
originary)? Salvation — from the angst in which history’s calam-
ities appear unmournable, unthinkable in themselves — is noth-
ing other than deliverance from the crystallization of the a-ic-
tion (and the a-icted person no matter what) in the atrocity’s 
unique number. Bearing witness to the other’s a-iction — not 
as atrocity — is the praxis that gets this deliverance going and 
keeps it alive.
10. Exodus and Deliverance
In the Old Testament story of the exodus of the Israelites from 
out of their bondage in Egypt, we also 'nd that the other, in a 
23 To be clear: Christ isn’t in the fashion of the no matter, in the two or the 
generic ethic, as Christ-in-Christianity is in the analogy of Christianity. To 
separate these two senses of “in,” recall the distinction I made previously 
between people as they are (who are a&icted) and people as such (who are 
seen under an atrocious aspect). In the generic ethic, one thinks along-
side — in responsibility for, in abnegation to — the generic and singular 
person, the person as they are. %e generic ethic isn’t an analogy that con-
tains, or claims to give exhaustive sense to, its terms (it doesn’t have terms 
understood as terms). Christ is in the fashion of the no matter what in 
this weak sense of “in”: when one welcomes Christ no matter what in the 
two, bearing witness to his a&iction, one thinks alongside him, without 
subsuming him under the qualities of an analogy. Christ-in-Christianity 
is in Christianity in a much stronger sense of “in”: he is seen to be only 
what he is within the nexus of Christianity. To put it another way, there’s 
nothing that is seen to transcend the three when it is counted-as-one; but 
the other transcends the three in being in the two. %is “being in” isn’t the 
same thing as “being totalized by.” It’s a transcendence in and through an 
immanent topology. 
158
DISEASES OF THE HEAD
sense that’s pivotal to the story, is the organon of deliverance. 
Moses has been called by God to go unto Pharaoh and to try 
to persuade him to release the Israelites from their servitude. 
He has been told that Pharaoh will deny this request, and that 
it will be necessary to do God’s wonders in order to convince 
Pharaoh, however momentarily, that he can’t keep the Israelites 
in bondage. It is essential, in order for Moses to be able to re-
lay the word of God to Pharaoh and demand the deliverance 
of the Israelites, that he be seen as other by Pharaoh.24 Moses, 
who had been reared among the Egyptians, who had not known 
of his own ancestry, had to leave Egypt and go out into the de-
sert in order to come back to Pharaoh as a stranger — not as an 
Egyptian. In Exodus, we read that God tells Moses: “Go in unto 
Pharaoh, and tell him, &us saith the Lord God of the Hebrews, 
Let my people go, that they may serve me.”25 Having been raised 
alongside Pharaoh, Moses must undergo his own exodus and 
return only years later, when he is truly exterior to Pharaoh and 
the whole Egyptian milieu. And even when he does return, he 
must — through enacting God’s wonders — continuously sepa-
rate himself from that milieu, continuously demonstrate that 
he is an outsider. He must not be like Pharaoh or of Pharaoh, 
24 %e remembrance of the two is, in part, a remembering of that encounter 
with the other I am to myself (it may "rst of all be this). It’s an encounter 
with transcendence that happens, as it were, in my very immanence. I am 
a stranger even to myself, and I welcome the stranger that I am to myself 
in a no matter what fashion in the two. I can forget this, and then forget 
this forgetting, failing to show myself hospitality and inhabiting a three-
as-one with respect to myself. In this way, I can totalize myself and see my 
own a&iction as atrocity. Or I can remember, welcome myself, and inhabit 
a coexistent two-and-three with respect to myself. %is is the case in my 
relationship with myself, just as it is in my relations with others. Consider 
Christ’s moment of kenosis: “My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken 
me?” Psalm 22:1 (King James Version). %is moment of kenosis is one of 
abnegation, the response to the call of a stranger. But who’s the stranger? 
It’s Christ, of course. In abnegation to myself, I greet what, within me, is 
other than what I am. In this hospitality, in the two of himself in which 
transcendence passes through immanence, Christ can then say, “into thy 
hands I commend my spirit.” Luke 23:46 (King James Version).
25 Exodus 9:1 (King James Version). 
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assimilable, but present as another, as a new face. He can re-
turn, to put it in the terms I have been suggesting in this essay, 
only when he is outside the analogical schema of the operative 
Egyptian three-as-one, beyond what’s “like” or “unlike” Pharaoh 
and di(erent only in degree. &en, and only then, is deliverance 
presently possible. And Moses, as the other — indeed, the other 
of Pharaoh (qua Israelite, a doer of God’s wonders) and the other 
of the Israelites he intends to work to save (qua Egyptian-reared, 
qua bringer of salvation) — is this deliverance’s organon. In this 
case, as in the messianic case of Christ, it is what’s 'rst no matter 
what (Moses himself, Christ himself, the a-icted of Sétif and 
Guelma themselves), and then recast against its analogical posi-
tion (against Moses “for” Pharaoh or “for” the Israelites, Christ-
in-Christianity, those who su(ered an atrocity) as other to it, 
that makes possible deliverance from analogy. And because the 
other is always present, because I can always remember the two 
in listening to the other’s call and so inhabit it from out of the 
three-as-one, abnegation to the other precedes even my being-
in-the-world or dwelling in analogies. I can remember the two’s 
primacy and thereby inhabit a coexistent two-and-three.
Deliverance from the view of the Israelites’ bondage in Egypt 
on which it’s seen as an atrocity happens in the remembrance 
of the Israelites’ a-iction. Each year at Passover, Jews around 
the world don’t say of the Israelites, “when they were slaves in 
Egypt,” but rather, “when we were slaves in Egypt.” &e use of 
the 'rst person here doesn’t signify the empathy of analogy. It 
isn’t that we are to step into the shoes of those who were slaves 
in Egypt, for this would just be to bridge the third person (they) 
and the 'rst person (we) by means of constructing an atrocity: 
the Israelites “for” us, as it were. &is isn’t what’s going on when 
it is said that we were slaves in Egypt. Rather, in bearing witness 
to the a-iction of the +esh and blood people who were slaves in 
Egypt, we recollect our place in the topology of the two and see 
that it is our burden to bear. We don’t empathize but abnegate. 
We disavow the notion of an atrocity that went on many years 
ago, that a(ected only our ancestors, and take up an a-iction 
that is always very much alive: the a-iction of ordinary people 
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who can’t be counted or rendered intelligible and thereby set 
aside, granted a 'nal meaning. We recollect the a-iction that 
happened in Egypt, and we are thus delivered from the atroc-
ity. We recollect the two in which we, condemned to abnega-
tion, welcome the other no matter what, without regard to their 
position in some analogy. We recollect that we, like Christ-
without-Christianity, are in the fashion of the no matter what, 
that we’re 'rst not analogical creatures, even if we secondarily 
assume analogical positions. We annul the condition of angst 
that characterizes the three-as-one in the remembrance of what 
really went on in Egypt, the remembrance of what really goes 
on today. And so, we treat the unique number of the count-as-x 
with a certain ascesis. 
In the remembrance of a-iction in the two, we recognize 
that just as the cruci'xion’s Christ is foreclosed to his position 
as the Christ of the ascension and conversion, so a-iction is 
foreclosed to atrocity and stands apart from it. In moving from 
atrocity to a-iction via an application of the razor of the no 
matter what, against the unique number of the count-as-x and 
x = one, we recall the secondary nature of the atrocity and the 
number in which it is crystallized. &e recollected two is an 
ethical space in which the self commends itself into the hands 
of the other, the victim of a-iction whosoever they are, no mat-
ter what they are. For they are the organon of deliverance from 
atrocity, to whom one attends in remembering the two. &is 
is a remembering of the self ’s abnegation to those who aren’t 
counted, those who can’t be counted because they are a-icted 
without atrocity. 
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